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ENGLISH JUDICIARY.-Sir CHARLES JASPER SELWYN, Lord,
Justice of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, died in August last,
and no successor has yet been appointed. The deceased Lord J us-
tice. was appointed in February, 1868, on the resignation of Lord
Justice ROLT. The appointment was not well received by the
profession at the time, but his judgments appear to have displayed
more learning and capacity than was anticipated, and his courtesy
of manner on the bench appear to have made him many friends.
Sir GEORGE HAYES, Justice of the Queen's Bench, died in No-
vember last of apoplexy. He was appointed in 1868, when the
number of the Judges of the Queen's Bench was increased to six,
and was considered a learned and sound lawyer. As Sergeant
Hayes, he was, for many years, considered the wittiest man at
the bar.
THE NEW YORK JUDICMARY.-The new Constitution framed by
the Convention of 1868, was submitted to the vote of the people in
November last, and was rejected. The Judiciary article, however,
which was voted on separately, was adopted by a small majority.
By this article the present shifting constitution of the Court of
Appeals is changed, and a court established consisting of seven
judges holding office for fourteen years. This is a great improve-
ment in the judicial organization of the State. but the good work
is only begun. 'rhe. article just adopted provides that in 18'13 a
vote of the people shall be taken on the question, whether the
judges shall not thereafter be appointed by the Governor for good
behavior. We trust that the people, and especially the bar, will
keep up their interest in the subject until they have secured a re-
turn to the system which in times past gave New York a judiciary
conspicuous for integrity learning and ability, and which, we believe,
all lawyers of all free countries regard as the only system by
which the bench can permanently retain its independence, or
merit the public confidence. J. T. M.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
2
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
3
ADMIRALTY. "
Jurisdiction of Cases on the Lakes.-Since the decision (A. D.
1851) in the Genessee ( Thief, 12 Howard, 443, which decided that
admiralty jurisdiction was notlimited in this country to tide waters,
hut extended to the lakes and the waters connecting them, the
From J. W. Wallace, Esi., Reporter: to appear in 8 Wall. Rep.
2 From Hon. N. L,. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 47 I. Rep.
3 rr m S. Hand, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 N. Y. Rep.
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previous Act of 1845 (5 Stat. at Large '26), entitled "An Act
extending the jurisdiction of the District Courts to certain cases
uipon the lakes and navigable waters connecting the same," and
wvhich went on the assumption (declared in the Genessee Ohief to
be a false one) that the jurisdiction of the admiralty was limited
to tide waters, has become inoperative and ineffectual, with the
exception of the clause which gives to either party the right of
trial by jury when requested. The District Courts, upon whom
the admiralty jurisdiction was exclusively conferred by the Ju.
diciary Act of 1789, can, therefore, take cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty jurisdiction upon the lakes and waters con-
necting them, the same upon the high -seas, bays, -and rivers navi-
gable from the sea: The Eagle, 8 Wall.
The court observes, also, that from the reasons given why the
Act of 1845 has become inoperative, the clause (italicized in the
lines below of this paragraph) in the ninth section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which confers exclusive original cognizance of all
civil cahses of admiralty jurisdiction upon the District courts,
"including all seizures under laws of import, navigation, or
trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters
which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons
burden, within their respective districts, as well as upon the high
seas," is equally in operative: Id.
AssuPSrIT.
Mistake of Fact.-In an action to recover back money paid un.
der a mistake of fact, it is no defense that the plaintiff had within
his reach the means of ascertaining the truth, or that he omitted
to use vigilance and care by which the mistake would have been
avoided: Kingston Bank v. Ettinge, 40 N. Y.
Nor is' it any defense to such an action, that the defendant cannot
be restored to his original position upon payingbackthe money: Id.
The owner of a judgment upon which an execution has been
issued, and a sale of personal property made thereunder, may
maintain an action to recover back the money received by the
sheriff upon the sale, from one to whom it has been paid with such
owner's assent under a mistake of fact: Id.
Accordingly, when the sheriff, having received an execution is-
sued upon the defendant's judgment, and afterward one upon a
subsequent judgment of the plaintiff against the same party, and
before the last had run out, but after sixty days had expired as to
the first, made a levy upon personal property not sufficient to satisfy
both, sold it and paid over the proceeds to the defendant in satis-
faction of his prior execution, with the assent of the plaintiff,
neither party knowing that that execution had run out before the
levy, but supposing the contrary-Held (DANIELS, J., dissenting),
that the latter could recover it back from the former as money
paid under a mistake of fact; and this, although either might
have easily learned the truth by inquiry of the sheriff, and although
tht defendant's judgment had been, in consequence of this receipt
of the money, cancelled and discharged of record: Id.
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CONFEDERATE STATES
License to trade with the Seceding States.-The military authori-
ties of the United States had no power, under the Act of July 13,
1861, to license commercial intercourse between the seceding States
and the rest of the United States: The Ouachita cotton case (6
Wallace 521) affirmed: McKee v. The United States, 8 Wall.
Such trade was not authorized in March, 1864, by regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury in pursuance of the
said Act, but on the contrary, was at that time forbidden by the
then existing regulations of the treasury: Id.
Even supposing such trade to have been licensed in March, 1864,
in pursuance of the Act of July 13, 1861, the license would nothave
authorized a purchase by a citizen 6f the United States from any
person then 'holding an office or agency under the Government of
the so-called Confederate States; all sales, transferg or conveyances
by such persons, being made void by the Act of July 17, 1862:. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Taking private property fbr public use-When allowable-Un.
der that clause in our Constitution which provides for the taking
of private property for public use, the use must be such as is pub-
lic in its character, and not public merely because it is declared to
be such.: East St. Louis v. St. John, 47 Ills.
A municipal corporation has not the power to condemn private
property for public use for purposes not specifically named in the
law, and which is not within the proper scope and meaning of the
delegated authority: Id.
So where the charter of the city of East St. Louis confers au-
thority on the city to "take private 1roperty for opening, altering
and laying out any street, lane, avenue, alley, public square, or
other public grounds," such delegated authority'does not confer
the power to condemn property on which to erect a city prison: Id.
Taxation of Imports.-Foreign goods sold by the shipper or
consignee to a third person, the same being still in the original
packages, on a vessel, before her actual arrival at the wharves of
her port, and, while owing to permanent shallowness of water, she
is at anchor some thirty miles off, outside a bar, where vessels of
her class usually anchor and are unloaded by lighters brought along-
side, are not protected from State taxation under the clause of the
Constitution, which says that "no State shall lay any imposts on
zmports," the risk of the shippers having, under the terms of the
purchase, ended when the goods were put on the lighters, the ves-
sel having been within the statutory port, and the custom-house
entries and other preceedings having been attended to by the con-
signees and not by the purchasers. Such a purchaser is not an
"importer :" Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall
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CONTRACT. See Courts.
COURTS.
Circuit Court of United States-Review by habeas corpus.-In
all cases where a Circuit Court of the United States has, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, caused a prisoner to be brought
before it, and has, after inquiring into the cause of detention, re-
tuanded him to the custody from which he was taken, this court,
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of
habeas corpus, aided by the writ of certiorari, revise the decision
of the Circuit Court, and if it be found unwarranted by law, re-
lieve the prisoner from the unlaivful restraint to which he has been
remanded: E x parte Yerger, 8 Wall.
The second section of the Act of March 27, 1868, repealing so
much of the Act of February 5th, 1867, as authorized appeals
from the Circuit courts to the Supreme courts, does not take
away or affect the appellate jurisdiction of this court by habeas
corpus under the Constitution and the Acts of Congress prior to
the date of the last-named Act: d.
First Possession of a Case.-A question which is pending in
one court of competent jurisdiction cannot be raised and agitated
in another by adding a new party and -raising a new question, as
to him, along with the old one, as to the former party. The old
question is in the hands of the court first possessed of it, and is
to be decided by such court. The new one should be by suit in
any proper court, against the new party: Memphis Company v.
Memphis, 8 Wall.
A contract by a city corporation with an existinggas company,
by which the corporation conferred upon the company the exclu-
sive privilege, for a term of years, and till notified to the contrary,
of lighting the city with such public lamps as might be agreed
on, and also the right to lily down its pipes and extend its appa-
ratus through all tie streets, alleys, lanes, or squares of the city,
which declared that "stillifurtler to encourage the company,
it would take fifty lamps to begin with, to be extended hereafter
as ihe public wants and increase of the city might demand, and
such as might be agreed upon by the company and the city corpo-
ration "--the company, in consideration of these grants, conces-
sions, and privileges, binding itself to furnish to the city gas at
half the price which they charged their private consumers, does
not give a right to the gas company. exclusive of the city corpora-
tion's right, to subscribe to the stock of a new gas company, whose
object was to introduce gas into the same city: Id.
Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.-A cause can be removed from a
State court into this court under the twenty-fifth section of the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789, whenever some one of the questions embraced in
it was relied on by the party who brings the cause here, and when the
right, which he asserted it gave him, was denied to him by the State
court, provided the record show, either by express averment or
by clear and necessary intendment, that the Constitutional pro-
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vision did arise, and that the court below could not have reached
the conclusion and judgment it did reach without applying it to
the ease in hand: Furman v. Michol, 8 Wall.
It need not app6ar that the State court erred in its judgment. It
Is sufficient to confer jurisdiction that the question was in the case,
was decided adversely to the plaintiff in error, and that the court
was induced by it to make the judgment which it did: Id.
The provision in section 12 of the Charter of 1838 of the Bank of
Tennessee, "that the bills or notes of said corporation, originally
made payable, or which shall have become payable on demand, in
gold or silver coin, shall be receivable at the treasury of the State,
and by all tax collectors and other public officers, in all payments
for taxes or other moneys due to the State," made a contract on
the part of the State with all persons, that the State would receive
for all payments for taxes or other moneys due to it, allbills of the
bank lawfully issued, while the section remained in force. The
guaranty was not a personal one, but attached to the note if so
issued, as much as if written on the back of it. It went with the
note everywhere, as long as it lasted, and although after the note
was issued, section 12 was repealed: Id.
Section 603 of the.Tennessee code of 1858, which enacted that
besides Federal money, controllers' warrants and Wild-cat certifi-
cates, the collector should receive "such bank notes as are current
and passing at par," did not amount to arepeal of the above quoted
12th section; the words of the code having no words of negation,
the two enactments being capable of standing together, and implied
repeals not being to be favored: Id.
This decision does not apply to issues of the bank while under
the control of the insurgents: Id.. ,
CrImiNAL LAW.
Murder-.Jury judges of the law and fact.-Under our statute,
juries in criminal cases are judges of the law, as well as of the
fact, and they have the right to pronounce upon the law as it may
seem, in their opinion, to be: Adams v. People, 47 Ills.
. While the doctrine is, that a man threatened with danger must
determine from appearances, and the actual state of things sur-
rounding him as to the necessity of resorting to self-defense, and
if he acts from reasonable and honest convictions, he will not be
held responsible, criminally, for a mistake as to the extent of the
actual danger, where other judicious men would have been alike
mistaken; at the same time, he has not the right to provoke a
quarrel and take advantage of it, and then justify the killing of
the party with whom he has provoked the quarrel: Id.
Where a party on trial upon the charge of murder defends upon
the ground ,that he acted in self-defense, evidence that the deceased
had a bowie-knife inside of his coat only a short time before the
killing, and that he declared he would cut the accused's heart out
with it, would have no weight with the jury, it not being shown the
prisoner knew the fact, or acted upon the suspicion of its existnnce,
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and it appearing the deceased had no evil designs toward the
accused, but rather that the latter sought the difficulty in which
the killing occurred: rd.
And in such a came, the dying declaration of the deceased, that
lie did not wish the accused hurt for what he had done, and that
accused had done nearly right, affords no evidence of anything
more than a Christian spirit of forgiveness toward one who had
done him great wrong, and a new trial would not be granted for
the purpose of enabling the accused to prove such declaration
upon the ground that it was newly discovered evidence: Id.
DEEDS.
Recording Acts-Subsequent Purchaser.-Under the recording
acts of Illinois, which enact that deeds shall take effect as against
creditors and subsequent purchasers from the time that they are
filed of record, it is necessary, in order to defeat a subsequent pur-
chaser for value of an unrecorded title, that he have notice of the
previous conveyance, or of some fact sufficient to put a prudent
man upon inquiry: Wills v. Smith, 8 Wall.
A recital in the record of another deed, made seventeen years
after a first one unrecorded, between the original grantor and the
heir-at-law of the original grantee-the grantor having already
sold to a second purchaser whose deed is recorded-4hat a sale
had been made to such original grantee, but no deed given, or if
given, lost, is not constructive notice to a third purchasing of such
second grantee: Id.
If either such second grantee, or purchaser from him, have
been a purchaser in good faith, without' notice, then such pur-
chaser is protected.: Id.
Courts of the United States are not bound to give instructions
upon specific requests by counsel for them. If the court charge
the jury rightly upon the case generally, it has done all that it
ought to do: Id.
EXECUTION. See Assumpsit.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
Arrest by Private Citizen.-An arrest by a private individual
is excused only where a felony has in fact been committed and
there was reasonable ground to suspect the person arrested of its
commission, although in truth innocent; but a constable is justified
in making an arrest without warrant, though no felony has been
actually committed, if he has reasonable ground to suspect that
one has been, and acts in good faith, and without evil design:
Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y.
Where there is no conflict in the evidence as to the circum.
stances in actions for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution,
the question of probable cause or reasonable ground of suspicion
is one of law and not for the jury: Id
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FIXTURES.
Where machinery is actually annexed to the land, it will bo
presumed to have been so attached with a view to the permanent
improvement, or beneficial enjoyment of the freehold, and will be
deemed a fixture and part of the realty, in the absence of proof
that the attachment was merely for the purpose of steadying and
adjusting the machine, or that the intention at the time existed,
not afterward abandoned, that the annexation should not be pe-
manent in its character, or that there is some agreement or rela-
tion of parties inconsistent with the supposition that a permanent
annexation was intended: Porter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y.
In determining the question, whether a particular article is a
fixture or not, the intention of the party who attached it to the
realty is an important element to be considered: Id.
Murdock v. Gifford (18 N. Y. 28), and lbrd v. Cobb (20 N.
Y. 344), distinguished: Id.
The definition of what constitutes a fixture, contained in Teaff
v. Hewitt (1 Ohio, N. S., 511), approved. DANIELS, J. : Id.
HABEAS CORPUS. See Courts.
HIGHWAYS.
Plank Roads-Plank roads are undoubtedly public highways,
and differ from common highways only in the mode of construc-
tion and the taking of tolls, and on the payment of the latter trav-
elers have the same right to use them they have to use other high-
ways: Craig v. People, ex rel. Nevill, 47 Ills.
Where a plank road has been used for a number of years by
the public, and the company have used a portion of a public high-
way as their roadway, causing the public road -to be closed up to
divert travel to their road, they cannot close up their road against
the public: Id.
The provisions of the statute in relation to the selling of plank
roads to counties, on the expiration of the charter of the road,
does not confer any authority on the company to close up such
road until the county purchases: Id.
Where the company forfeit their charter, or abandon it, or suffer
the road to so become out of repair as to amount to an abandon-
ment, the right of way of the company ceases, and the road
becomes a common highway: Id.
So, where the lessees or assignees of a companypublish a notice,
that owing to the bad condition of the road, the high price of mate-
rials and labor, they cannot profitably keep up the road at the pre-
scribed tolls, and that unless the county bought their entire interest
to roadway, bridges, plank, toll-gates, etc., the road would be closed
up as private property-Held, that such notice was, in effect, an
abandonment of the road, and thatit became a commonhighway: Id.
HOMESTEAD.
Abandonment.-The owner of a homestead, and occupying the
same as such, and located at Zenia, in Clay county, Illinois, on the
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25th of April, 1863, removed with Lis family to Nebraska; on the
23d of July, 1864, he returned to Salem, Illinois, where he has since
resided. In the meantime, on the 16th of October, 1863, an execu-
tion was issued on a judgment obtained against the owner, and
directed to the sheriff of Clay county, who levied the same upon
the premises at Zenia, so claimed as a homestead, and on the 15th of
December, 1863, sold the same under the execution-Held, this
was an abandonment of the homestead, and it thereby became li-
able to levy andsale under execution: Maher v. Mc Uonaga, 37 Ills.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Cbntracte Between.-It is the rule of the common law that con-
tracts between husband and wife are void, and will not be enforced
by the courts: Sweeney et ux. v. Damron et al., 47 Ills.
But where such contracts have been made in good faith, and are
executed, they are valid: Id.
So, where a husband has received money belonging to his wife,
and invests it for her in her name, or has property bought by her
money, conveyed to her, courts of equity will treat the transaction
as fair, and sustain it against subsequent creditors of the husband
chargeable with notice: Id.
And where, not being in debt, with a view of making provision
for his wife, property is bought with his own means, and conveyed
to her, or to trustees for her use, the transaction will be sustained: Id.
If the husband is in debt, as to his creditors existing at the time
of such transaction, they would be fraudulent, unless such creditors
are satisfied subsequently: Id.
The wife may intrust means which she inherits, since the Act of
1861, to her husband to loan or invest, and it will be protected in
his hands to the same extent the money of a stranger would under
like circumstances: rd.
Where the legal title to landA, purchased with the means of the
wife, is in.the husband, and he exchanges these lands for others,
and has the deeds of the latter made to his wife, equity will up-
hold the title of the wife, aS' -against creditors not misled by the
title standing in the husband: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Railroad.
PRAOTIos.
Where a question is asked of a witness, which is illegal only
because it may elicit improper testimony, and the court permits it
to be answered against the objection of the other party, if the wit-
ness knows nothing of the matter to which he is interrogated, or it
his answer is favorable to the objecting party, it works him no
injury, and is not error of which a revising court can take notice:
Nailor v. Williams, 8 Wall.
If it does work the objecting party injury, he can show it by
making the answer a part of the bill of exceptions, and unless he
does this there is no error of the sort mentioned- Id.
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Where there is nothing in the bill of exceptions which enables a
revising court to say that questions objected to have exceeded the
reasonable license which a court, in its discretion, may allow in
cross-examination, no error is shown: Id.
RAILROADS.
Diligence Required.-Railroads and private individuals, with
respect to the same subject matter, are held to the exercise of the
same degree of diligence in preventing injury to others: 0. and .
R. B. Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 Ills.
It is not negligence perse for a railroad to suffer grass and weeds
to accumulate on its right of way; the fact, however, is proper evi-
dence for the injury, who may find negligence from it: id.
Land owners contiguous to railroads are as much bound, in law,
to keep their lands free from an accumulation of dry grass and
weeds as railroad companies are; so where a fire is ignited on the
company's right of way, and is communicated to fields adjoining,
the negligence of such owner will be held to have contributed to
the loss: Id.
And unless it appears that the negligence of the company is
greater than that of such land owner, the latter cannot recover for
injuries thus arising: Id.
SALE.
Pdssession by Vendor-In sales of personil property, where the
vendoi at the time his possession, a warranty of the title is implied:
Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y.
-The plaintiffs sold to F. a yoke of oxen, and it was agreed that
the oxen were to remain the property of the plaintiffs until they
should be paid for by F., the latter in the meantime having pos-
session. F. afterward, and before he had paid for them, sold the
* oxen to the defendant, who paid a full price and bought in good
faith, without notice of the plaintiff's rights-Hel (JAMEs and
MURRAY, JJ., contra), that the defendant acquired no title as
* against the plaintiffs: Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y.
Wait v.. Green (36 N. Y. 556), distinguished: Id.
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.
Investments by.-The law, in this State, imposes upon trustees,
holding trust funds for investment for the benefit of minor chil-
dren, to be supported from the income accruing therefrom, the duty
of placing them in a state of security, of seeing that they are pro-
ductive of interest, and of so keeping them that they may always
be subject tb future recall, for the benefit of the cestui que trust:
' King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y.
In this State, a trustee holding funds for investment for the benefit
of minor children, must invest in government or real estate securi-
ties. Any other investment would be a breach of duty and the
trustees personally liable. MURRAY, GROVER, DANIELS, and JAmES,
JJ. Contra, HUNT, Ch. J., MASON and LOTT, JJ.: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
UNITED STATES.
Extra Pay to Salaried Employee.-The Act of August 28d, 1842,
dcelaring that no officer of the Government drawing a fixed salary,
shall receive additional compensation for any service, unless it is
authorized by law, and a specific appropriation made to pay it, is
not repealed by the twelfth section of the Act of August 26, the
same year: Stansbury v. United States, 8 Wall.
An agreement by the Secretafy of the Interior to pay a clerk in
his depattment for services rendered to the Government by labors
abroad--the clerk still holding his place aqd drawing his pay as
clerk in the interior-was, accordingly, held void: Id
Contracts by the Executive-War Department.-The war de-
partment, by its proper officers, may make a valid contract for the
slaughtering, curing and packing of pork, when that is the most
expedient mode of securing any supplies of that kind: U. S. v.
Speed, 8 Wall.
Such a contract, when for a definite amount of such work, is
valid, though it contains no provision for its termination by the
Commissary General at his option: Id.
The Act of March 2d, 1861, requiring such contracts to be ad-
vertised, authorizes the officer in chargeof the matter to dispense
with advertising when the exigencies of the service requires it,
and it is settled that the validity of a contract, under such cir-
cumstances, does not depend on the degree of skill or wisdom with
which the discretion thus conferred is exercised: Id.
Where the obligation of one party to a contract requires of
him the expenditure of a large sum in preparation to perform, and
a continuous readiness to perform, the law implies a correspond-
ing obligation on the other party to do what i% necessary to enable
the first to comply with his agreement: Id.
Where the defendant agreed to pack a definite number of hogs
for the plaintiff, and made all his preparations to do so, and was
ready to do so, but the defendant refused to furnish the hogs to be
packed, the measure of damages is the difference between cost of do-
ing the work and the price agreed to be paid for it, making reasonable
deductions for the less time engaged, and for release from the care,
trouble, risk and responsibility attending its full execution: Id.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES.
Interference with Natural Channel.-Equity will interpose, by
mandatory injunction, to compel the restoration of running water
to its natural channel, when wrongfully diverted, atthe suit of the
party whose lands include either the whole or a part of such chan-
nel: Corning et al v. Troy Iron and Nail Factory. 40 N. Y.
The grounds for equitable interposition in such a case are two-
fold: First, the inadequacy of any legal remedy to secure the
party in the enjoyment of his right to have the water flow in its
natural channel. Second, to prevent a multiplicity of suits foi
damages accruing from the daily and continuous wrongful diver.
sion of the stream: Id.
